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Abstract
We study revenue optimization learning algorithms for repeated second-price
auctions with reserve where a seller interacts with multiple strategic bidders each
of which holds a fixed private valuation for a good and seeks to maximize his
expected future cumulative discounted surplus. We propose a novel algorithm that
has strategic regret upper bound of O(log log T ) for worst-case valuations. This
pricing is based on our novel transformation that upgrades an algorithm designed
for the setup with a single buyer to the multi-buyer case. We provide theoretical
guarantees on the ability of a transformed algorithm to learn the valuation of a
strategic buyer, which has uncertainty about the future due to the presence of rivals.
1 Introduction
Revenue maximization is one of fundamental development directions in major Internet companies that
have their own online advertising platforms [35, 12, 1, 27, 41]. Most part of ad inventory is sold via
widely applicable second price auctions [38, 57] and their generalizations like GSP [72, 73, 74, 69].
Adjustment of reserve prices plays a central role in revenue optimization here: their proper setting is
studied both by game-theoretical methods [61, 4] and by machine learning approaches [62, 19, 57, 64].
In our work, we focus on a scenario where the seller repeatedly interacts through a second-price
auction withM strategic bidders (referred to as buyers as well). Each buyer participates in each round
of this game, holds a fixed private valuation for a good (e.g., an ad space), and seeks to maximize his
expected future discounted surplus given his beliefs about the behaviors of other bidders. The seller
applies a deterministic online learning algorithm, which is announced to the buyers in advance and,
in each round, selects individual reserve prices based on the previous bids of the buyers. The seller’s
goal is to maximize her revenue over a finite horizon T through regret minimization for worst-case
valuations of the bidders [59, 29]. Thus, the seller seeks for a no-regret pricing algorithm.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing study investigated worst-case regret optimizing algorithms
that set reserve prices in repeated second-price auctions with strategic bidders whose valuation is
private, but fixed over all rounds. However, our setting constitutes a natural generalization of the well-
studied 1-buyer setup of repeated posted-price auctions1 (RPPA) [6, 59] to the scenario of multiple
buyers in a second-price auction. In the RPPA setting, there are optimal algorithms [27, 28, 29] that
have tight strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ). This bound follows from an ability of the seller
to upper bound the buyer valuation even if he lies when rejecting a price [27, Prop.2]. This ability
strongly exploits that the buyer knows in advance the outcomes of a current and all future rounds
since he has complete information due to the absence of rivals. In our multi-bidder scenario, this
does not hold: a bidder has incomplete information and is thus uncertain about the future. Hence,
1In particular, when M = 1, our auction in a round reduces to a posted-price one: the bidder has no rivals
and his decision is thus binary (to accept or to reject a currently offered price).
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the theoretical guarantees could not be directly ported to our scenario when trying straightforwardly
apply the optimal 1-buyer RPPA algorithms.
In our study, we propose a novel algorithm that can be applied against our strategic buyers with regret
upper bound of O(log log T ) (Th. 1) and constitutes the main contribution of our work. We also
introduce a novel transformation of a RPPA algorithm that maps it to a multi-buyer pricing and is
based on a simple but crucial idea of cyclic elimination of all bidders except one in each round (Sec.3).
Construction and analysis of the proposed algorithm and transformation have required introduction of
novel techniques, which are contributed by our work as well. They include (a) the method to locate
the valuation of a strategic buyer in a played round under his uncertainty about the future (Prop. 1);
(b) the decomposition of strategic regret into the regret of learning the individual valuations and the
deviation regret of learning which bidder has the maximal valuation (Lemma 1); and (c) the approach
to learn the highest-valuation bidder with deviation regret of O(1) w.r.t. T (Lemma 3).
2 Preliminaries: setup, background, and overview of results
Setup of Repeated Second-Price Auctions. We study the following mechanism of repeated second-
price auctions. Namely, the auctioneer repeatedly proposes goods (e.g., advertisement opportunities)
to M bidders (whose set is denoted by M := {1, . . . ,M},M ∈ N) over T rounds: one good per
round. From here on the following terminology is used as well: the seller for the auctioneer, a buyer
for a bidder, and the time horizon for the number of rounds T . Each bidder m ∈ M holds a fixed
private valuation vm ∈ [0, 1] for a good, i.e., the valuation vm is equal for goods offered in all rounds
and is unknown to the seller. The vector of valuations of all bidders is denoted by v := {vm}Mm=1.
In each round t∈ {1, . . . , T}, for each bidder m∈M, the seller sets a personal reserve price pmt ,
and the buyer m (knowing pmt ) submits a sealed bid of b
m
t . Given the reserve prices pt:={pmt }Mm=1
and the bids bt:= {bmt }Mm=1, the standard allocation and payment rules of a second price auction
are applied [64]: (a) for each bidder m ∈M, we check whether he bids over his reserve price or
not, amt :=I{bmt ≥pmt }, obtaining the set Mt:={m∈M | amt = 1} of actual bidder-participants; (b)
if Mt 6= ∅, the good is allocated to the winning bidder mt := argmaxm∈Mt bmt (if a tie, choose
randomly) who pays pt := max{pmtt ,maxm∈Mt\{mt} bmt } to the seller. (c) if Mt =∅, the current
good disappears and no payment is transferred. Further we use the following notations for allocation
indicators, payments, and their vectors: at := I{Mt 6=∅}, amt := I{Mt 6=∅&m=mt}, pmt := amt pt,
at :={amt }Mm=1, at :={amt }Mm=1, and pt :={pmt }Mm=1. The summary on all notations is in App. C.
Thus, the seller applies a (pricing) algorithm A that sets reserve prices p1:T := {pt}Tt=1 in response
to the buyers’ bids b1:T := {bt}Tt=1. We consider the deterministic online learning case when the
reserve price pmt for a bidder m ∈M in a round t ∈ {1, . . . , T} can depend only on bids b1:t−1 of all
bidders during the previous rounds and, possibly, the horizon T . LetAM be the set of such algorithms.
Hence, given a pricing algorithm A ∈ AM , the buyers’ bids b1:T uniquely define the corresponding
price sequence {pt}Tt=1, which, in turn, determines the seller’s total revenue
∑T
t=1 atpt. This revenue
is usually compared to the revenue that would have been earned by offering the highest valuation
v := maxm∈M vm if the valuations v = {vm}Mm=1 were known in advance to the seller [6, 27]. This
leads to the notion of the regret of the algorithm A: Reg(T,A,v,b1:T ) :=
∑T
t=1(v − atpt).
Following a standard assumption in mechanism design that matches the practice in ad exchanges [59,
29], the seller’s pricing algorithm A is announced to the buyers in advance. A bidder can then act
strategically against this algorithm. In contrast to the case of one bidder (M = 1), where the buyer
can get an optimal behavior in advance, and the repeated mechanism reduces thus to a two-stage
game [6, 59, 27]; in our setting, a bidder has incomplete information since he may not know the
valuations and behaviors of the other bidders. Therefore, in order to model buyer strategic behavior
under this uncertainty, we assume that, in each round t, each buyer optimizes his utility on subgame
of future rounds given the available history of previous rounds and his beliefs about the other buyers.
Formally, in a round t, given the seller’s pricing algorithm A, a strategic buyer m ∈ M observes
a history hmt :=(b
m
1:t−1, p
m
1:t, a
m
1:t−1, p
m
1:t−1) available to him and derives his optimal bid b˚
m
t from a
(possibly mixed) strategy σ ∈ ST 2 that maximizes his future γm-discounted surplus:
2A buyer strategy is a map σ : H1:T → R+ that maps any history h ∈ Ht in a round t to a bid σ(h) ∈ R+,
whereH1:T := unionsqTt=1Ht andHt := Rt−1+ ×Rt+×Zt−12 ×Rt−1+ . Let ST denote the set of all possible strategies.
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Surt:T (A, γm, vm, hmt , βm, σ) = E
[ T∑
s=t
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , σ, βm
]
, (1)
where γm ∈ (0, 1] is the discount rate3 of the bidder m. The expectation in Eq. (1) is taken over
all possible continuations of the history hmt w.r.t. a strategy σ ∈ ST of the buyer m and his beliefs
βm about the strategies of the other bidders M−m := M\{m}4. The buyer m assumes that the
other bidders are strategic in the sense described above as well, what is taken into account in the
beliefs βm5. When T rounds has been played, let b˚t := {˚bmt }Mm=1 be the optimal bids that depend on
(T,A,v,γ,β), where γ = {γm}Mm=1 and β = {βm}Mm=1. We define the strategic regret of the
algorithmA that faced M strategic buyers with valuations v∈ [0, 1]M and beliefs β over T rounds as
SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) :=Reg(T,A,v, b˚1:T (T,A,v,γ,β)).
In our setting, following [6, 59, 27, 29], we seek for algorithms that attain o(T ) strategic regret for
the worst-case valuations v ∈ [0, 1]M . Formally, an algorithm A is said to be a no-regret one when
supv∈[0,1]M ,β SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) = o(T ) in our multi-buyer case. The optimization goal is to find
algorithms with the lowest possible strategic regret upper bound O(f(T )), i.e., f(T ) has the slowest
growth as T →∞ or, alternatively, the averaged regret has the best rate of convergence to zero.
Background on pricing algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, there is no work studied worst-
case regret optimizing algorithms that set reserve prices in repeated second-price auctions with
strategic bidders whose valuation is private, but fixed over all rounds. However, in the case of one
bidder, M = 1, the bidder has no rivals, and, thus, the second-price auction in a round t reduces to
a posted-price auction, where the buyer decision reduces to a binary action: to accept or to reject a
currently offered price p1t . Let A
RPPA ⊂ A1 be the subclass of the 1-bidder algorithms s.t. each
reserve price p1t depends only on the past binary decisions a
1
1:t−1 of the buyer to get or do not get a
good for a posted reserve price. For this subclass, all our strategic setting of repeated second-price
auctions reduces to the setup of repeated posted-price auctions (RPPA) earlier introduced in [6].
Pricing algorithms in the strategic setup of RPPA with fixed private valuation and worst-case regret
optimization were well studied last years [6, 59, 27, 29]. It is known that, if the discount rate γ=1,
any algorithm has a linear strategic regret, i.e., the regret has lower bound Ω(T ) [6], while, for the
other cases γ ∈ (0, 1), the lower bound of Ω(log log T ) holds [46, 59]. The first algorithm with
optimal strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ) was found in [27]. It is Penalized Reject-Revising
Fast Exploiting Search (PRRFES), which is horizon-independent and is based on Fast Search [46]
modified to act against a strategic buyer. The modifications include penalizations (see Def. 1). A
strategic buyer either accepts the price at the first node or rejects this price in subsequent penalization
ones [59, 27]. PRRFES is also a right-consistent algorithm: a RPPA algorithm A1 is right-consistent
(A1 ∈ CR) if it never offers a price lower than the last accepted one [27]. The algorithm PRRFES
was further modified by the transformation pre to obtain the one that never decreases offered prices
and has a tight strategic regret bound of Θ(log log T ) as well [29].
The workflow of a RPPA algorithmA1 is usually described by a labeled binary treeT(A1) [59, 27, 29]:
initialize the tracking node n to the root e(T(A1)); in each round, the label p(n) is offered as a price;
if it is accepted (rejected), move the tracking node to the right child n :=r(n) (the left child n := l(n),
resp.); and go to the next round. The left (right) subtrees rooted at the node l(n) (r(n), resp.) are
denoted by L(n) (R(n), resp.). When trees T1 and T2 have the same node labeling, we write T1∼=T2.
Definition 1. For a RPPA algorithm A1 ∈ARPPA, nodes n1, ..., nr ∈ T(A1) are said to be a (r-
length) penalization sequence if ni+1= l(ni), p(ni+1)=p(ni), and R(ni+1)∼=R(ni), i=1, .., r−1.
Overview of our results. We cannot directly apply the optimal RPPA algorithms [27, 29], because
our bidders have incomplete information in the game, while the proofs of optimality of these
algorithms strongly rely on complete information. This completely different information structure
of the multi-buyer game results in very complicated bidder behavior even in the absence of reserve
prices [14]. Hence, it is challenging to find, in the multi-buyer case, a pricing algorithm that has
3Note that only buyer utilities are discounted over time, what is motivated by real-world markets as online
advertising where sellers are far more willing to wait for revenue than buyers are willing to wait for goods [59, 29].
4So, σ and βm determine the future outcomes ams and pms , that are thus random variables.
5In our setup, we do not require that the strategies actually used by the buyers M−m match with the buyer
m’s beliefs βm (an equilibrium requirement), because our results hold without this requirement.
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regret upper bound of the same asymptotic behavior as the best one in the 1-buyer RPPA setting. Our
research goal comprises closing of this research question on the existence of such algorithms.
First, we propose a novel technique to transform a RPPA algorithm to our setup that is based on cyclic
elimination of all bidders except one by means of high enough prices (Sec. 3). Separate playing with
each buyer removes his uncertainty about the outcome of a current round; and, despite remaining
uncertainty about future rounds, this is enough to construct a tool to locate his valuation (Prop. 1).
Second, we transform PRRFES in this way and show that its regret is affected by two learning
processes: the one learns bidder valuations and the other learns which bidders have the maximal
valuation (Sec. 4). The former learning is controlled by the design of the source PRRFES, while the
latter one is achieved by a special stopping rule that excludes bidders from suspected ones. A proper
combination of parameters for the source pricing and the stopping rule provides an algorithm with
strategic regret in O(log log T ), see Th. 1.
Related work. Several studies maximized revenue of auctions in an offline/batch learning fashion:
either via estimating or fitting of distributions of buyer valuations/bids to set reserve prices [38, 69, 64],
or via direct learning of reserve prices [57, 58, 67, 54]. In contrast to them, we set prices in
repeated auctions by an online deterministic learning approach. Revenue optimization for repeated
auctions was mainly concentrated on algorithmic reserve prices, that are updated in online way
over time, and was also known as dynamic pricing [33, 25]. Dynamic pricing was considered:
under game-theoretic view [50, 22, 11, 8, 56]; from the bidder side [44, 75, 39, 13]; in experimental
studies [52, 16, 76]; as bandit problems [5, 51, 18]; and from other aspects [66, 31, 21, 41]. Repeated
auctions with a contextual information about the good in a round were considered in [7, 24, 53, 49].
The studies [68, 36, 26, 43, 71] elaborated on setups of repeated posted-price auctions with a strategic
buyer holding a fixed valuation, but maximized expected revenue for a given prior distribution of
valuations, while we optimize regret w.r.t. worst-case valuations without knowing their distribution.
There are studies on reserve price optimization in repeated second-price auctions, but they considered
scenarios different to ours. Non-strategic bidders are considered in [19]. Kanoria et al. [45] studied
strategic buyers (similarly to our work), but maximized expected revenue w.r.t. a prior distribution
of valuations. Our setup can be considered as a special case of repeated Vickrey auctions in [40],
but their regret upper bound is O(Tα) in T and holds only when selling several goods in a round.
However, the most relevant works to ours are [6, 59, 27, 29], where our strategic setup with fixed
private valuation is considered, but for the case of one bidder, M = 1. The most important results of
these works are discussed above in this section (see “Background on pricing algorithms").
3 Dividing algorithms and div-transformation
Barrage pricing. In our setting, a pricing algorithm is able to set personal (individual) reserve prices
to each bidder and is able hence to “eliminate" particular bidders from particular rounds. Namely,
in a round t, an algorithm can set a reserve price pbar s.t. a strategic bidder m, independently of his
valuation, will never accept pbar, i.e., will never bid no lower than this price; such a price is referred
to as a barrage reserve price. From here on we use pbar = 1/(1− γ0), γ0 ∈ (0, 1): accepting it once
will result in a negative surplus for a buyer with discount γi ≤ γ0. We use the phrase “the bidder m
is eliminated6 from participation in the round t" to describe this case.
Dividing algorithms. In this subsection, we introduce a subclass of the algorithms AM that is
denoted by AdivM ⊂ AM and is referred to as the class of dividing algorithms (stands for lat. “Divide
et impera"). A dividing algorithm A ∈ AdivM works in periods and tracks a feasible set of suspected
bidders S aimed to find the bidder (or bidders) with the maximal valuation v. Namely, it starts with all
bidders S1 := M at the first period which lasts M rounds. In each period i ∈ N, the algorithm iterates
over the currently suspected bidders Si: in a current round, it picks up m ∈ Si, sets a non-barrage
reserve price to the bidder m, sets a barrage reserve price to all other bidders M−m, and goes to the
next round within the period by picking up the next buyer from Si. Thus, the algorithm meaningfully
interacts with only one bidder in each round through elimination of all other bidders by means of
barrage pricing. After the i-th period, the algorithm A identifies somehow which bidders from Si
should be left as suspected ones in the next period (i.e., be included in the set Si+1).
6Note that, (a) formally, all bidders participate in all rounds (see Sec. 2) and (b), if a bidder is not eliminated,
it does not mean that he is in Mt (he may bid below his reserve price which can be a non-barrage one). So, the
word “elimination" is purposely associate with barrage pricing in order to refer to this case.
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When the game has been played with the dividing algorithm A, one can split all the rounds into I
periods: {1, . . . , T} = ∪Ii=1Ti. Each period i < I consists of |Ti| = |Si| rounds (the last one of|TI | ≤ |SI |). Let tmi ∈ Ti denote the round of a period i in which a bidder m is not eliminated by the
seller algorithm (i.e., receives a non-barrage reserve price). Thus, Im := {tm1 , ..., tmIm} are all such
rounds of the bidder m and Im = |Im| is referred to as the subhorizon of the bidder m (the number
of periods where he participates). Note that (a) Im and Im depend on the bids b1:T of all buyers M;
(b) the following identities hold: {1, . . . , T} = ∪Mm=1Im and Ti = {tmi | m ∈M s.t. Im ≥ i}.
So, in a round tmi , the algorithm A eliminates the bidders M−m (i.e., sets the reserves pm
′
tmi
= pbar
∀m′∈M−m), while the reserve price pmtmi set for the buyer m is determined only by his bids during
the previous rounds {tm1 , ..., tmi−1} where he has not been eliminated: i.e., pmtmi =pm(bmtm1 , ..., bmtmi−1).
Hence, the algorithm A’s interaction with the bidder m in the rounds Im can be encoded by
a 1-buyer algorithm from A1, which sets prices in the rounds {tmi }I
m
i=1 instead of {i}I
m
i=1. We
denote this algorithm by Am and refer to it as the subalgorithm of A against the buyer m. Let
Regm(Im,Am, vm, bm1:T ) :=
∑Im
i=1(v
m−amtmi pmtmi ) be the regret of the subalgorithm Am for given
bids bm1:T of the buyer m ∈M in the rounds Im. The lemma holds (the trivial proof is in App. A.1.1).
Lemma 1. Let A ∈ AdivM be a dividing algorithm, Am ∈ A1,m ∈ M, be its subalgorithms
(as described above), and b˚1:T = b˚1:T (T,A,v,γ,β) be optimal bids of the strategic buyers M.
Then, for any v ∈ [0, 1]M , γ ∈ (0, 1]M , and β, the strategic regret of A can be decomposed
into two parts SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) = SRegind(T,A,v,γ,β) + SRegdev(T,A,v,γ,β), where
SRegind(T,A,v,γ,β) := ∑m∈M Regm(Im,Am, vm, b˚m1:T ) is the individual part of the regret and
SRegdev(T,A,v,γ,β) := ∑m∈M Im(v − vm) is the deviation part of the regret.
Informally, this lemma states that the regret consists of the individual regrets against each buyer m in
his rounds Im and the deviation of the buyer valuations v from the maximal one v. So, we see a clear
intuition: a good algorithm should (1) learn the valuations v of the buyers (minimizing individual
regrets) and (2) learn which buyers have the highest valuation v (minimizing the deviation regret).
div-transformation. Let A1 ∈ ARPPA be a 1-buyer RPPA algorithm. An algorithm divM (A1, sr)
is said to be a div-transformation of A1 with a stopping rule sr : M × T(A1)M → bool when
it is a dividing algorithm from AdivM s.t. its subalgorithms Am are A1 and the stopping rule sr
determines which bidders are not suspected ones in Si+1 after a period i. Namely, first, the algorithm
divM (A1, sr) tracks the state of each buyer m ∈ M in the tree T(A1) of the RPPA algorithm A1
(see Sec. 2) by means of a personal (individual) feasible node. For each period i and for each round
tmi ∈ Ti, the current state (i.e., the history of previous actions) of the buyer m is encoded by the
tracking node nmi ∈ T(A); in particular, in the round tmi , he receives the reserve price p(nmi ) of
this node nmi (the other bidders M−m get a barrage reserve price pbar). If a buyer m is not more
suspected in a period i > Im (i.e., m 6∈ Si), we formally set nmi := nmIm+1. Second, after a period i,
the stopping decision is based on the past buyer binary actions that are coded by means of the nodes
{nmi+1}Mm=1 in the binary tree T(A1): if the stopping rule sr(m′, {nmi+1}Mm=1) is true, then the buyer
m′ 6∈ Si+1. The pseudo-code of the div-transformation of a RPPA algorithm is in Appendix B.1.
For a RPPA right-consistent algorithmA1∈CR with penalization rounds, let 〈A1〉 denote the transfor-
mation of A1 s.t. it is equal to A1, but each penalization sequence of nodes {nj}rj=1⊂T(A1), r ≥ 2,
(see Def. 1) is reinforced in the following way: all the prices in the nodes {nj} ∪R(nj), j = 2, ..., r,
are replaced by 1 (the maximal valuation domain value); the sequence and the rounds are then referred
to as reinforced penalization ones. After this, a strategic buyer will certainly either accept the price at
the node n1, or reject the prices in all the nodes {nj}rj=1 even in the case of uncertainty about the
future. Let δln := p(n)− infm∈L(n) p(m) be the left increment [59, 27] of a node n ∈ T(A1).
In order to obtain upper bounds on strategic regret, it is important to have a tool that allows to locate
the valuation of a strategic bidder. Such a tool can be obtained for div-transformed right-consistent
RPPA algorithms with reinforced penalization rounds based on the following proposition, which is
an analogue of [27, Prop.2] in our case with buyer uncertainty about the future.
Proposition 1. Let γm ∈ (0, 1), A1 ∈ ARPPA ∩CR be a RPPA right-consistent pricing algorithm,
n∈T(A1) be a starting node in a r-length penalization sequence (see Def. 1), r > logγm(1− γm),
sr :M×T(A1)M→bool be a stopping rule, and the div-transformation divM (〈A1〉, sr) be used by
the seller for setting reserve prices. If, in a round, the node n is reached and the price p(n) is rejected
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by a strategic buyer m∈M (i.e., he bids lower than p(n)), then the following inequality on vmholds:
vm − p(n) < ζr,γmδln, where ζr,γ := γr/(1− γ − γr). (2)
Proof sketch. The full proof is in App.A.1.2. Let t be the round in which the bidder m reaches the
node n and rejects his reserve price pmt = p(n). In particular, it is the round where he is the non-
eliminated buyer and t= tmi ∈Ti for some period i. Since the buyers are divided and A1∈ARPPA,
w.l.o.g., any strategy can be treated as a map to binary decisions {0, 1}. Let σ˚ be the optimal strategy
used by the buyer m; hmt;a be the continuation of the current history h
m
t by a binary decision a
m
t =a,
while σˆa denote an optimal strategy among all possible strategies in which the binary buyer decision
amt is a ∈ {0, 1}; and Smt (σ) := Surt:T (A, γm, vm, hmt , βm, σ) be the future expected surplus when
following a strategy σ∈ST . Rejection of the price pmt when following the optimal strategy σ˚ easily
implies: Smt (σˆ1) ≤ Smt (σˆ0). Let us bound each side of this inequality. First,
Smt (σˆ1) = γ
t−1
m (v
m − p(n)) + Surt+1:T (A, γm, vm, hmt;1, βm, σˆ1) ≥ γt−1m (vm − p(n)), (3)
where we used the facts (i) that if the bidder accepts the price p(n), then he necessarily gets the
good since all other bidders M−m are eliminated by a barrage price in this round t; and (ii) that the
expected surplus in rounds s ≥ t+ 1 is at least non-negative, because the subalgorithm A1 ∈ CR is
right-consistent. Second, Smt (σˆ0) = Surtmi+r:T (A, γm, vm, hmt;0, βm, σˆ0) <
γt+r−1m
1−γm (v
m−p(n)+δln),
where we (i) used the fact that if the bidder rejects the price pmt , then the future rounds {tmi+j}r−1j=1
will be reinforced penalization ones (the strategic bidder will reject in all of them); and (ii) upper
bounded the surplus in remaining rounds by assuming that only this bidder will get remaining goods
for the lowest reserve price from the left subtree L(n). We unite these bounds on Smt (σˆa) and get
(vm − p(n)) (1− γm − γrm) < γrmδln, what implies Eq. (2), since r > logγm(1− γm).
We emphasize that the dividing structure of the algorithm is crucially exploited in the proof of Prop. 1.
Namely, the fact that all other bidders M−m are eliminated by a barrage price in the round t is used
(a) to guarantee obtaining of the good at price p(n) by the buyer m and (b) to lower bound thus
the future surplus Smt (σˆ1) in the case of acceptance in Eq. (A.4). If we dealt with a non-dividing
algorithm, then another bidder might win the good or make the payment of the bidder m higher than
his reserve price p(n); in both cases, Smt (σˆ1) could only be lower bounded by 0 in a general situation,
what would result in an useless inequality instead of Eq. (2).
For a right-consistent algorithm A1 ∈ CR, the increment δln is bounded by the difference between
the current node’s price p(n) and the last accepted price q by the buyer m before reaching this node.
Hence, the Prop. 1 provides us with a tool to locate the valuation vm despite the strategic buyer does
not myopically report its position (similar to [27, Prop.2]). Namely, if the buyer m bids no lower
than p(n), then vm ≥ p(n); if he bids lower than p(n), then q≤v<p(n)+ζr,γm(p(n)− q) and the
closer an offered price p(n) is to the last accepted price q the smaller the location interval of possible
valuations vm (since its length is (1 + ζr,γm)(p(n)−q)).
4 divPRRFES algorithm
In this section, we will show that we can use an optimal algorithm from the setting of repeated posted-
price auctions to obtain the algorithm for our multi-bidder setting with upper bound on strategic
regret with the same asymptotic. Namely, let us div-transform PRRFES [27], further denoted as A1.
Since a div-transformation of PRRFES (with penalization reinforcement) individually tracks position
of each buyer in the binary tree T(〈A1〉), we adapt the key notations of PRRFES [27] to our case
of multiple bidders and periods. Against a buyer m∈M, PRRFES 〈A1〉 works in phases initialized
by the phase index l :=0, the last accepted price before the current phase qm0 :=0, and the iteration
parameter 0 := 1/2; at each phase l ∈ Z+, it sequentially offers prices pml,k := qml +kl, k ∈ N
(exploration rounds), with l=2−2
l
; if a price pml,k is rejected, setting K
m
l :=k−1≥0, (1) it offers
the price 1 for r−1 reinforced penalization rounds (if one of them is accepted, 1 will be offered in
all remaining rounds), (2) it offers the price pml,Kml for g(l) exploitation rounds, and (3) PRRFES
goes to the next phase by setting qml+1 :=p
m
l,Kml
and l := l + 1. Individual tracking of bidders by the
div-transformed PRRFES implies that different buyers can be in different phases in the same period i.
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Hence, let lmi denote the current phase of a buyer m∈M in the round tmi of a period i≤Im, and let
lmi := l
m
Im+1 in all subsequent periods i>I
m (when the buyer m is no more suspected). In particular,
qmlmi
is the last accepted price by the buyer m before the phase lmi in the period i. We rely on the
decomposition from Lemma 1 in order to bound the strategic regret of a div-transformed PRRFES.
Upper bound for individual regrets. Before specifying a particular stopping rule, let us obtain an
upper bound on individual strategic regret Regm(Im, 〈A1〉, vm, b˚m1:T ),m ∈M. This regret is not
equal to SReg(Im, 〈A1〉, (vm), (γm)) since, in the latter case, the 1-bidder game does not depend on
behavior of the other bidders M−m (while, in the former case, does). In other words, the rounds
Im={tmi }I
m
i=1 do not constitute the I
m-round 1-buyer game of the RPPA setting considered in
[6, 27], because the subhorizon Im and exact rounds Im (they determine the used discount factors:
γt−1m , t ∈ Im) are unknown in advance and depend on actions of the other bidders. Hence, this does
not allow to straightforwardly utilize the result on the strategic regret for PRRFES proved in [27,
Th.5] for the setting of RPPA. So, we have to prove the bound O(log log T ) for our case with buyer
uncertainty about the future. Let us introduce the notation: rγ :=
⌈
logγ
(
(1− γ)/2)⌉ ∀γ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 2. Let γ0 ∈ (0, 1), A1 be the PRRFES algorithm with r ≥ rγ0 and the exploitation rate
g(l)=22
l
, l ∈ Z+, and sr :M×T(A1)M→bool be a stopping rule. Then, if Im≥2, the individual
regret of the div-transformed PRRFES divM (〈A1〉, sr) against the buyer m∈M is upper bounded:
Regm(Im, 〈A1〉, vm, b˚m1:T ) ≤ (rvm + 4)(log2 log2 Im + 2) ∀γm ∈ (0, γ0] ∀vm ∈ [0, 1], (4)
where b˚1:T = b˚1:T (T, divM (〈A1〉, sr),v,γ,β) are optimal bids of the strategic buyers M.
Proof sketch. Decompose the individual regret over the rounds Im into the sum of the phases’ regrets:
Regm(Im,〈A1〉,vm ,˚bm1:T )=
∑Lm
l=0R
m
l , where L
m:=lmIm is the number of phases conducted by the
algorithm against the buyer m. For l∈ZLm−1: Rml =
∑Kml
k=1(v
m−pml,k)+rvm+g(l)(vm−pml,Kml ),
where the terms correspond to the accepted exploration rounds, the reject-penalization ones, and
the exploitation ones. PRRFES and each rejected price pml,Kml +1 satisfy the conditions of Prop. 1,
what implies vm−pml,Kml +1 < (p
m
l,Kml +1
−pml,Kml ) = l (since ζr,γm ≤ 1 for r≥rγ0 and γm≤γ0).
Hence, vm∈[qml+1,qml+1+2l) (since qml+1=pml,Kml and PRRFES is right-consistent) and the number
of exploration rounds is thus bounded: Kml+1 < 2
2l+1. All further steps are similar to [27, Th.5]:∑Kml
k=1(v
m−pml,k) < 2; for each phase l, we get that Rml ≤rvm + 4; and the number of phases
Lm≤log2 log2 Im+1. The full proof is in Appendix A.2.1 of Supp. Materials.
Upper bound for deviation regret. Prop. 1 provides us with the tool that locates the valuation vm of
a bidderm∈M at least in the segment [umi , wmi ] := [qmlmi , q
m
lmi
+2lmi −1] right after a period i−1 (see
the proof [sketch] of Lemma 2), when r ≥ rγm . This means: if, after playing a period i−1, the upper
bound wmi of the valuation of a bidder m ∈ M is lower that the lower bound umˆi of the valuation
of another bidder mˆ ∈ M−m, i.e., wmi <umˆi , then the bidder m does definitely have non-maximal
valuation (i.e., vm<v) and needs not to be suspected in the period i and subsequent ones. For given
parameters r and g(·) of the PRRFES algorithm A1, any state n∈T(A1) of the algorithm can be
mapped to the current phase l(n) and the last accepted price q(n) before the phase l(n). Thus, we
define the stopping rule: srA1(m,{nm}Mm=1) :=ρ(m,{l(nm)}Mm=1,{q(nm)}Mm=1), where
ρ(m, l,q) := ∃mˆ ∈M−m : qm + 2lm−1 < qmˆ ∀l ∈ ZM+ ∀q ∈ RM+ . (5)
The div-transformation divM (〈A1〉, srA1) of the PRRFES algorithm A1 with the stopping rule srA1
defined in Eq. (5) is referred to as the dividing Penalized Reject-Revising Fast Exploiting Search
(divPRRFES). The pseudo-code of divPRRFES is presented in Appendix B.2 of Supp.Materials.
Lemma 3. Let γ0 ∈ (0, 1), the discounts γ ∈ (0, γ0]M , and the seller uses the divPRRFES pricing
algorithm divM (〈A1〉, srA1) with the number of penalization rounds r ≥ rγ0 , with the exploitation
rate g(l) = 22
l
, l ∈ Z+, and with the stopping rule srA1 defined in Eq. (5). Then, for a bidder
m ∈M with non-maximal valuation, i.e., vm < v, his subhorizon Im is bounded:
Im ≤ 24(v − vm)−1 + r(1 + log2 log2(4(v − vm)−1)) < (24 + 5r)(v − vm)−1. (6)
Proof sketch. Let m be a buyer with the maximal valuation v. Note that, in any period j = 1, .., Im,
the location intervals [qmlmj , q
m
lmj
+ 2lmj −1] and [q
m
lmj
, qm
lmj
+ 2lmj −1] must intersect (otherwise, the
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stopping rule srA1 has eliminated the buyer m before the period j, and, hence, j > I
m). In particular,
in the period Im, L(m′,m) ≥ (v − vm)/4 holds for either m′ = m or (not exclusively) m′ = m,
where L(m′,m) := lm
′
Im . From the definition of the iteration parameter l, i.e. log2 l = −2l, one
can obtain the bound on one of the phases: min{L(m,m), L(m,m)} ≤ log2 log2(4/(v − vm)). To
bound the subhorizon Im, decompose it into the numbers of exploration, reject-penalization, and
exploitation rounds in each phase l = 0, . . . , L(m′,m) played by a buyer m′∈{m,m}. Applying
techniques similar to the ones used in the proof of Lemma 2 (in particular, the bound on the number of
exploration rounds: Km
′
l ≤2 ·22
l−1
), we get: Im≤(L(m′,m)+1)r+2 ·3 ·22L(m′,m) for m′∈{m,m}.
This combined with the previous inequality implies Eq. (6). The full proof is in App. A.2.2.
This lemma implies the upper bound for the deviation part of the strategic regret of the divPRRFES
pricing algorithm A = divM (〈A1〉, srA1) against the strategic buyers M: SRegdev(T,A,v,γ,β)=∑M
m=1 I
m(v−vm)≤(24+5r)(M −1). Let us denote byM :={m∈M | vm=v} the set of bidders
with the maximal valuation and by v := maxm∈M\M v
m the highest valuation among non-maximal
ones. Thus, we showed that learning of the max-valuation biddersM converges with the rate inversely
proportional to v− v (i.e., after the period d(24 + 5r)/(v− v)e the set of suspected bidders is always
Si = M) and this learning contributes a constant (w.r.t. the horizon T ) to the strategic regret. Finally,
Lemma 1, 2, and 3 trivially imply (see App. A.2.3) the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let γ0 ∈ (0, 1), A1 be the PRRFES algorithm with r ≥ rγ0 and the exploitation rate
g(l)=22
l
, l∈Z+, and srA1 be the stopping rule defined in Eq.(5). Then, for T≥2, the strategic regret
of the divPRRFES pricing algorithm A=divM (〈A1〉, srA1) against the buyers M is upper bounded:
SReg(T,A,v,γ,β)≤M(rv+4)(log2 log2 T+2)+(24+5r)(M−1) ∀γ∈(0,γ0]M∀v∈[0,1]M∀β. (7)
5 Discussion, extensions of the result, and conclusions
Other auction formats. The techniques and algorithms developed in our work can be applied in
repeated auctions where another format of selling a good in a round is used. Namely, our results hold
in our repeated setting with an auction format (within rounds) that satisfies the following: (a) personal
reserve prices are allowed; and (b) if a buyer m is only one non-eliminated participant in a round t,
then his bidding mechanism allows him to choose between getting the good for the reserve price pmt
and rejecting it. This holds e.g. for first(/third/..)-price auctions, for PPA with multiple bidders, etc.
Regret dependence on M . The upper bound of the divPRRFES regret in Eq. (7) linearly depends on
M . We believe that it is not an artifact of our analysis tools, but a payment for the div-transformation.
Consider the case in which all bidders have the same valuation, i.e., all their valuations are v. Each
bidder will be always suspected by divPRRFES (i.e., be in Si ∀i). Hence, divPRRFES will just learn
the valuation v for each of M bidders independently and, thus, M times slower; i.e., it is natural
that the regret of divPRRFES is M times larger than the regret of PRRFES against a single buyer.
However, there might exist an algorithm that do not suffer from dividing structure in this way. So,
existence of an algorithm with a more favorable regret dependence on M is an open research question.
Lower bound and optimality. For the case M = 1, there does exist the lower bound: the strategic
regret of any pricing algorithm is Ω(log log T ) [59]. Hence, our upper bound for the algorithm
divPRRFES is optimal in the general case of any number of bidders. Nonetheless, structure of the
game with non-single buyer (M ≥ 2) is much more complicated, since a buyer has to act in the
presence of rivals and under uncertainty about the future. This is an additional opportunity that can
be exploited by a pricing algorithm. Thus, the validity of the lower bound Ω(log log T ) for M ≥ 2 is
an open research question. Several other discussions of the results are also in App. D.
6 Conclusions
We studied the scenario of repeated second-price auctions with reserve pricing where a seller interacts
with multiple strategic buyers. Each buyer participates in each round of the game, holds a fixed
private valuation for a good, and seeks to maximize his expected future discounted surplus. First,
we proposed the so-called dividing transformation that upgrades an algorithm designed for the setup
with a single buyer to the multi-buyer case. Second, the transformation allowed us to obtain a novel
horizon-independent algorithm that can be applied against strategic buyers with regret upper bound
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of O(log log T ). Finally, we introduced non-trivial techniques such as (a) the method to locate the
valuation of a strategic buyer in a played round under buyer uncertainty about the future; (b) the
decomposition of strategic regret into the individual and deviation parts; and (c) the approach to learn
the highest-valuation bidder with deviation regret of O(1).
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A Missed proofs
A.1 Missed proofs from Section 3
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Let Im = {tmi }I
m
i=1 be the set of rounds in which the bidder m is not eliminated by a barrage re-
serve pricing. Therefore, we have decomposition of the sequence of all rounds into the union of these sets:
{1, . . . , T} = ∪m∈MIm. Note that we also have a splitting in periods {1, . . . , T} = ∪Ii=1Ti and the intersec-
tion Im ∩ Ti = {tmi } for m ∈ M, i = 1, . . . , Im.
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So, formally, we have
SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) = Reg(T,A,v, b˚1:T (T,A,v,γ,β))= T∑
t=1
(v−atpt)=
∑
m∈M
Im∑
i=1
(v−atmi ptmi ), (A.1)
where the two first identities follow from definitions, while the latter one is just a change of the order of
summation (since {1, . . . , T} = ∪m∈MIm = ∪m∈M{tmi }I
m
i=1). The terms in the sum could be decomposed in
the following way: v − atmi ptmi = v − v
m + vm − atmi ptmi . Also note, since, in each round t
m
i , the bidders
M−m are eliminated by a barrage reserve price, then the allocation indicator atmi and the transferred payment
ptmi
depend only on the behavior of the bidder m in this round, i.e., atmi = a
m
tmi
, ptmi = p
m
tmi
, and, if amtmi = 1,
ptmi
= pmtmi
= pmtmi . So, we can continue Eq. (A.1):
SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) =
∑
m∈M
Im∑
i=1
(v − vm + vm − atmi ptmi )
=
M∑
m=1
Im∑
i=1
(v − vm) +
M∑
m=1
Im∑
i=1
(vm − amtmi p
m
tmi
)
=
M∑
m=1
Im(v − vm) +
M∑
m=1
Regm(Im,Am, vm, b˚m1:T ),
= SRegdev(T,A,v,γ,β) + SRegind(T,A,v,γ,β).
(A.2)
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let t be the round in which the bidder m reaches the node n and rejects his reserve price pmt , which is
equal to pmt = p(n) by the construction of the algorithm divM (〈A1〉, sr). Note that, in the round t, all other
bidders M−m are eliminated by a barrage price and the reserve prices set by the div-algorithm divM (〈A1〉, sr)
depend only on a1:T (because A1 ∈ ARPPA and sr : M× T(A1)M → bool). Therefore, it is easy to see that,
for any strategy σ, the expected future surplus Surt:T (A, γm, vm, hmt , βm, σ) of the bidder m as a function of
the bid bmt = σ(hmt ) in the round t depends, in fact, only on the binary decision amt = I{bmt ≥pmt }: more formally,
the expected surplus is constant when the bid bmt is changed within {bmt ≥ pmt } and is constant when the bid bmt
is changed within {bmt < pmt }. Moreover, since the buyers are divided (in the whole game) andA1 ∈ ARPPA, if
two strategies σ′ and σ′′ ∈ ST do not differ in their binary output, i.e., I{σ′(h)≥pmt } = I{σ′′(h)≥pmt }∀h ∈ H1:T ,
then they have the same future discounted surplus. Hence, any strategy can be treated as a map to binary decisions
{0, 1} (instead of R+). Let σˆa denote an optimal strategy among all possible strategies in which the binary
decision amt in the round t is a ∈ {0, 1}, i.e., I{σˆa(hmt )≥pmt } = a and σˆa maximizes
E[
T∑
s=t
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , amt = a, σ, βm].
Given a strategy σ ∈ ST , let us denote the future expected surplus when following this strategy by Smt (σ) :=
Surt:T (A, γm, vm, hmt , βm, σ). When the optimal strategy σ˚m (used by the buyer) is pure, we directly have
Smt (σˆ1) ≤ Smt (˚σm) = Smt (σˆ0), since the price pmt is rejected (amt = 0) by our strategic buyer. In the general
case, when the buyer’s optimal strategy σ˚m is mixed, let α0 be the probability of a reject (amt = 0) and, thus,
1− α0 be the probability of an acceptance (amt = 1) in this strategy. Since the strategy is optimal, its surplus
Smt (˚σ
m) = α0S
m
t (σˆ0) + (1− α0)Smt (σˆ1) must be no lower than the surplus Smt (σˆ1) of the strategy σˆ1:
α0S
m
t (σˆ0) + (1− α0)Smt (σˆ1) ≥ Smt (σˆ1).
Since the price pmt is rejected, the probability α0 > 0 and, thus, α0Smt (σˆ0) ≥ α0Smt (σˆ1). In any way, we
obtain:
Smt (σˆ1) ≤ Smt (σˆ0). (A.3)
Let us bound each side of this inequality:
Smt (σˆ1) = E[
T∑
s=t
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , amt = 1, σˆ1, βm] =
= γt−1m (v
m − p(n)) + E[
T∑
s=t+1
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , amt = 1, σˆ1, βm] ≥
≥ γt−1m (vm − p(n)),
(A.4)
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where, in the second identity, we used the fact that if the bidder accepts the price p(n), then he necessarily gets
the good since all other bidders M−m are eliminated by a barrage price in this round t (it is the key point of
the proof!). In the last inequality, we used that the expected surplus in rounds s ≥ t+ 1 is at least non-negative,
because the subalgorithm A1 ∈ CR is right consistent and accepting of the offered price p(m) in some reached
node m ∈ T(A1) s.t. p(m) > vm will thus result in reserve prices for him higher than his valuation vm in all
subsequent rounds as well (so, the buyer has no incentive to get a local negative surplus in a round, because it
will result in non-positive surplus in all subsequent rounds).
Smt (σˆ0) = E[
T∑
s=t
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , amt = 0, σˆ0, βm] =
= E[
T∑
s=tmi+r
γs−1m a
m
s (v
m − pms ) | hmt , amt = 0, σˆ0, βm] ≤
≤
T∑
s=t+r
γs−1m (v
m − p(n) + δln) < γ
t+r−1
m
1− γm (v
m − p(n) + δln),
(A.5)
where i is the current period of the div-algorithm divM (〈A1〉, sr), i.e., the round t = tmi ∈ Ti is such that the
buyer m is the non-eliminated participant in this round (see Sec.3). In the second identity, we used the fact that
if the bidder rejects the price pmt , then the future rounds {tmi+j}r−1j=1 (in which the bidder will be non-eliminated)
will be reinforced penalization rounds (and the strategic bidder will reject prices in all of them as well). In
the first inequality, we just upper bounded surplus by assuming that only this bidder left among the suspected
bidders Sj , j > i, and he receives the lowest possible reserve price from the left subtree L(n) of the node n. The
latter inequality is just a simple arithmetic upper bound for the sum of discounts
∑T
s=t+r γ
s−1
m .
We unite these bounds on Smt (σˆ0) and Smt (σˆ1) (i.e., Eq. (A.3), (A.4), and (A.5)), divide by γt−1m , and get
(vm − p(n))
(
1− γ
r
m
1− γm
)
<
γrm
1− γm δ
l
n, (A.6)
that implies the inequality claimed by the proposition, since r > logγm(1− γm).
A.2 Missed proofs from Section 4
A.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The game has been played and b˚1:T = b˚1:T (T,divM (〈A1〉, sr),v,γ,β) are the resulted optimal bids
of the strategic buyers M. So, let Lm := lmIm be the number of phases conducted by the algorithm during the
rounds Im = {tmi }I
m
i=1 against the strategic buyer m. Then we decompose the total individual regret over these
rounds into the sum of the phases’ regrets: Regm(Im, 〈A1〉, vm, b˚m1:T ) =
∑Lm
l=0R
m
l . For the regret Rl at each
phase except the last one, the following identity holds:
Rml =
Kml∑
k=1
(vm − pml,k) + rvm + g(l)(vm − pml,Km
l
), l = 0, . . . , Lm − 1, (A.7)
where the first, second, and third terms correspond to the exploration rounds with acceptance, the reject-
penalization rounds, and the exploitation rounds7, respectively. Since the basis of the subalgorithm PRRFES
A1 ∈ CR is right-consistent [27], as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1 (see Appendix A.1.2), the optimal
strategy of the bidder m is non-losing [27]: the buyer has no incentive to get a local negative surplus in a round,
because it will result in non-positive surplus in all subsequent rounds.
Hence, since the price pml,Km
l
is 0 or has been accepted, we have pml,Km
l
≤ vm. Second, since the price pml,Km
l
+1
is rejected, we have vm − pml,Km
l
+1 < (p
m
l,Km
l
+1 − pml,Km
l
) = l (by Proposition 1 since ζr,γm ≤ 1 for r ≥ rγ0
and γm ≤ γ0). Hence, the valuation vm ∈
[
pml,Km
l
, pml,Km
l
+ 2l
)
and all accepted prices pml+1,k, ∀k ≤ Kml+1,
from the next phase l + 1 satisfy:
pml+1,k ∈ [qml+1, vm) ⊆
[
pml,Km
l
, pml,Km
l
+ 2l
) ∀k ≤ Kml+1,
because any accepted price has to be lower than the valuation vm for the strategic buyer (whose optimal
strategy is locally non-losing one, as we stated above). This infers Kml+1 < 2l/l+1 = 2Nl+1, where
7Note that the prices at the exploitation rounds pml,Km
l
are equal to either 0 or an earlier accepted price, and
are thus accepted by the strategic buyer (since the buyer’s decisions at these rounds do not affect further pricing
of the algorithm divPRRFES).
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Nl := l−1/l = −1l−1 = 2
2l−1 . Therefore, for the phases l = 1, . . . , Lm, we have:
vm − pml,Km
l
< 2l; v
m − pml,k < l
(
2Nl − k
) ∀k ∈ Z2Nl ;
and
Kml∑
k=1
(vm − pml,k) < l
2Nl−1∑
k=1
(
2Nl − k
)
= l
2Nl − 1
2
(
2 · 2Nl − 2Nl
) ≤ 2Nl ·Nll = 2Nl · l−1 = 2,
where we used the definitions ofNl and l. For the zeroth phase l = 0, one has trivial bound
∑Km0
k=1(v−pm0,k) ≤
1/2. Hence, by definition of the exploitation rate g(l), we have g(l) = −1l and, thus,
Rml ≤ 2 + rvm + g(l) · 2l ≤ rvm + 4, l = 0, . . . , L− 1. (A.8)
Moreover, this inequality holds for the Lm-th phase, since it differs from the other ones only in possible absence
of some rounds (reject-penalization or exploitation ones). Namely, for the Lm-th phase, we have:
RmL =
KmL∑
k=1
(vm − pmLm,k) + rLmvm + gLm(Lm)(vm − pmLm,Km
Lm
), (A.9)
where rLm is the actual number of reject-penalization rounds and gLm(Lm) is the actual number of exploitation
ones in the last phase. Since rLm ≤ r and gLm(Lm) ≤ g(Lm), the right-hand side of Eq. (A.9) is upper-
bounded by the right-hand side of Eq. (A.7) with l = Lm, which is in turn upper-bounded by the right-hand side
of Eq. (A.8). Finally, one has
Regm(Im, divM (〈A1〉, sr), vm, b˚m1:T ) =
Lm∑
l=0
Rml ≤ (rvm + 4) (Lm + 1).
Thus, one needs only to estimate the number of phases Lm by the subhorizon Im. So, for 2 ≤ Im ≤
2 + r + g(0), we have Lm = 0 or 1 and thus Lm + 1 ≤ 2 ≤ log2 log2 Im + 2. For Im ≥ 2 + r + g(0),
we have Im =
∑Lm−1
l=0 (K
m
l + r + g(l)) + K
m
Lm + rLm + gLm(L
m) ≥ g(Lm − 1) with Lm > 0. Hence,
g(Lm−1) = 22L
m−1 ≤ Im, which is equivalent to Lm ≤ log2 log2 Im+1. Summarizing, we get the claimed
upper bound of the lemma.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Let m ∈ M be one of the bidders M = {m∈M | vm= v} that have the maximal valuation v. Then,
the stopping rule srA1 (which is based on the rule ρ(m, l,q) := ∃mˆ ∈ M−m : qm + 2lm−1 < qmˆ ∀l ∈
ZM+ , ∀q ∈ RM+ ) is executed no later than the period i′ where the upper bound qmlm
i′
+ 2lm
i′ −1 of the bidder m’s
valuation becomes lower than the lower bound qm
lm
i′
of the bidder m’s valuation8.
Moreover, since vm ∈ [qmlmj , q
m
lmj
+ 2lmj −1] and v
m ∈ [qm
lmj
, qm
lmj
+ 2lmj −1] for any period j, the stopping rule
is executed no later than the period i where both the phase iteration parameter lmi of the bidder m and the
phase iteration parameter lmi of the bidder m become smaller than one quarter of the difference between the
valuations of these bidders, i.e., lmi and lmi <
v−vm
4
(because, in this case, the segments [qmlmi , q
m
lmi
+ 2lmi −1]
and [qm
lmi
, qm
lmi
+ 2lmi −1] do not intersect at all, what implies q
m
lmi
+ 2lmi −1 < q
m
lmi
).
Therefore, in the periods i ≤ Im, it is not possible to have simultaneously lmi < v−v
m
4
and lmi <
v−vm
4
. So,
in the period i = Im, either lm
Im
≥ v−vm
4
, or (not exclusively) lm
Im
≥ v−vm
4
holds. In particular, from the
definition of the phase iteration parameter l = 2−2
l
, we have: if l ≥ δ for some l ∈ Z+ and δ ∈ (0, 1/2),
then
l = 2
−2l ≥ δ ⇔ −2l ≥ log2 δ ⇔ 2l ≤ log2
1
δ
⇔ l ≤ log2 log2
1
δ
.
Hence, in the period Im, the following holds:
lmIm ≤ log2 log2
4
v − vm or (not exclusively) l
m
Im ≤ log2 log2
4
v − vm ,
8Note that it is correct to consider lmi in any period i even though the buyer m is not suspected in this period,
i.e., m /∈ Si. This is because the algorithm stops change the tracking node nmi in the subalgorithm tree T(〈A1〉)
after the period Im, but lmi just remains the same in all subsequent periods, i.e., we formally set l
m
i = l
m
Im for
all i > Im.
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and, thus,
min{lmIm , lmIm} ≤ log2 log2
4
v − vm . (A.10)
Finally, we bound Im. Let, Lm
′;m := lm
′
Im be the phase of a buyer m
′ ∈ {m,m} in the period Im. As in the
proof of Lemma 2 (see Appendix A.2.1) we decompose Im into the numbers of exploration, reject-penalization,
and exploitation rounds in each phase l = 0, . . . , Lm
′;m passed by the buyer m′. Namely,
Im =
Lm
′;m−1∑
l=0
(Km
′
l + r + g(l)) +K
m′
Lm
′;m + r
m′
Lm
′;m + g
m′
Lm
′;m , (A.11)
where rm
′
l and g
m′
l are the numbers of penalization rounds and exploitation rounds, resp., passed by the buyer
m′ in the last phase l = Lm
′;m before reaching the period Im. Let us trivially bound rm
′
Lm
′;m ≤ r and
gm
′
Lm
′;m ≤ g(Lm
′;m). We also know that, for any l ∈ Z+, Km′l ≤ 2 · 22
l−1
(see the proof of Lemma 2 in
Appendix A.2.1). Therefore, Eq. A.11 implies
Im ≤
Lm
′;m∑
l=0
(2 · 22l−1 + r + 22l) ≤
Lm
′;m∑
l=0
(3 · 22l + r) ≤ (Lm′;m + 1)r + 2 · 3 · 22L
m′;m
, (A.12)
Taking m′ = m and m′ = m, we get the following from Eq. (A.12):
Im ≤ (min{lmIm , lmIm}+ 1)r + 6 · 22
min{lm
Im
,lm
Im
} ≤ r(log2 log2
4
v − vm + 1) + 6 ·
4
v − vm , (A.13)
where we used the definition of Lm
′;m := lm
′
Im and the upper bound for the phases l
m
Im and l
m
Im in Eq. (A.10).
So, Eq. (A.13) implies the claim of the lemma.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. From Lemma 1, we have:
SReg(T,A,v,γ,β) =
M∑
m=1
Regm(Im,Am, vm, b˚m1:T ) +
M∑
m=1
Im(v − vm). (A.14)
From Lemma 2, if Im ≥ 2, one can upper bound the first term in right-hand side of Eq. (A.14) sinceAm = 〈A1〉:
Regm(Im,Am, vm, b˚m1:T ) ≤ (rvm + 4)(log2 log2 Im + 2) ≤ (rv + 4)(log2 log2 T + 2), (A.15)
where we bounded the subhorizon Im of each bidder m ∈ M by the time horizon T (i.e., Im ≤ T ) and the
valuation vm of each bidder m ∈ M by the maximal valuation (i.e., vm ≤ v). Note that the latter bound of
Eq. (A.15) holds for Regm(Im,Am, vm, b˚m1:T ) in the case of Im = 1 as well (this case has not been provided
by Lemma 2).
From Lemma 3, one can upper bound the second term in right-hand side of Eq. (A.14):
M∑
m=1
Im(v − vm) ≤
∑
{m∈M|vm 6=v}
24 + 5r
v − vm (v − v
m) ≤ (24 + 5r)(M − 1), (A.16)
where we used that at least one bidder m ∈ M has vm = v and, hence, |{m ∈ M | vm 6= v}| ≤M − 1.
Thus, plugging Eq. (A.15) and Eq. (A.16) into Eq. (A.14), we obtain the claimed bound for the strategic regret
of divPRRFES.
B The pseudo-codes
B.1 The pseudo-code of div-transformation
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Algorithm B.1 Pseudo-code of a div-transformation divM (A1, sr) of a RPPA algorithm A1 ∈
ARPPA.
1: Input: M ∈ N, A1 ∈ ARPPA, sr : M× T(A1)M → bool
2: Initialize: t := 1, S := M, n[ ] := {e(T(A1))}Mm=1
3: while t ≤ T do
4: for all m ∈ S do
5: Set the price p(n[m]) as reserve to the buyer m
6: Set the price pbar as reserve to the buyers from M−m
7: b[ ]← get bids from the buyers M
8: if b[m] ≥ p(n[m]) then
9: Allocate t-th good to the buyer m for the price p(n[m])
10: n[m] := r(n[m])
11: else
12: n[m] := l(n[m])
13: end if
14: t := t+ 1
15: if t > T then
16: break
17: end if
18: end for
19: Sold := S
20: for all m ∈ Sold do
21: if sr(m, n[ ]) then
22: S := S \ {m}
23: end if
24: end for
25: end while
B.2 The pseudo-code of divPRRFES
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Algorithm B.2 Pseudo-code of the algorithm divPRRFES.
1: Input: M ∈ N, r ∈ N, and g : Z+ → Z+
2: Initialize: t := 1, S := M, q[] := {0}Mm=1, l[] := {0}Mm=1, x[] := {0}Mm=1, state[] := {”explore”}Mm=1
3: while t ≤ T do
4: for all m ∈ S do
5: if state[m] = ”penalize” then
6: p := 1 // a reinforced penalization round for the buyer m
7: x[m] := x[m]− 1
8: end if
9: if state[m] = ”explore” then
10: p := q[m] + 2−2
l[m]
// an exploration round for the buyer m
11: else
12: p := q[m] // an exploitation round for the buyer m
13: x[m] := x[m]− 1
14: end if
15: Set the price p as reserve to the buyer m
16: Set the price pbar as reserve to the buyers from M−m
17: b[ ]← get bids from the buyers M
18: if b[m] ≥ p then
19: Allocate t-th good to the buyer m for the price p
20: q[m] := p
21: if state[m] = ”penalize” then
22: x[m] := −1 // a reinforced penalization price is accepted; set 1 to the buyer m all his rounds
23: end if
24: else
25: if state[m] = ”explore” then
26: state[m] := ”penalize”
27: x[m] := r // an exploration price is rejected; move the buyer m to penalization
28: end if
29: end if
30: if state[m] = ”penalize” and x[m] = 0 then
31: state[m] := ”exploit”
32: x[m] := g(l[m]) // penalization rounds are ended; move the buyer m to exploitation
33: end if
34: if state[m] = ”exploit” and x[m] = 0 then
35: state[m] := ”explore”
36: l[m] := l[m] + 1 // exploitation rounds are ended; move the buyer m to the next phase
37: end if
38: t := t+ 1
39: if t > T then
40: break
41: end if
42: end for
43: Sold := S
44: qmax := maxm∈M(q[m])
45: for all m ∈ Sold do
46: if q[m] + 2 ∗ 2−2l[m]−1 < qmax then
47: S := S \ {m} // remove the buyer m from suspected ones if the stopping rule is satisfied
48: end if
49: end for
50: end while
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Table C.1: General notations: part I.
Notation Expression Description
E[·] expectation
IB the indicator: IB = 1, when B holds, and 0, otherwise.
T the [time] horizon, the number of rounds in the repeated game
t a round in the repeated game, t ∈ {1, . . . , T}
vm the valuation of a buyer m
v = maxm∈M vm the highest valuation among the buyers
v = maxm∈M\M v
m the maximal valuation among non-highest valuations ot the buyers (if
exists)
m a buyer that has the highest valuation v
mt = argmaxm∈Mt b
m
t the winning bidder in a round t for a given play of the game (if exists)
bmt the bid of a buyer m in a round t for a given play of the game
pmt the reserve price set to a buyer m in a round t for a given play of the
game
amt = Ibmt ≥pmt indicator of bidding higher than the reserve price by a buyer m in a
round t for a given play of the game
amt = I{Mt 6=∅&m=mt} the allocation outcome of a round t for a bidder m for a given play of
the game
at = I{Mt 6=∅} the allocation outcome of a round t over all bidders for a given play of
the game
pmt = a
m
t pt the payment outcome of a round t for a bidder m for a given play of the
game
pt = max{pmtt ,maxm∈M−mtt b
m
t } the payment outcome of a round t over all bidders for a given play of the
game
x = {xm}Mm=1 the vector of buyer values of some notion x (e.g., valuations v, bids bt,
reserve prices pt, payments pt, allocations at and at etc)
xt1:t2 = {xt}t2t=t1 the subseries of some time series {xt}Tt=1 (e.g., bids b1:T , reserve prices
p1:T , payments p1:T , allocations a1:T and a1:T etc)
AM the set of pricing algorithms of the seller against M buyers
ARPPA ⊂ A1 the subclass of 1-buyer pricing algorithms for repeating posted-price
auctions
A a pricing algorithm (generally, from the set AM )
M the number of buyers in the repeated game
M = {1, . . . ,M} the set of buyers (bidders)
M = {m ∈M | vm = v} the set of buyers whose valuation is the highest one v
M−m = M \ {m} the set of buyers (bidders) without the buyer m
Mt = {m ∈M | bmt ≥ pmt } the set of actual buyers in a round t (they bid higher than reserve prices)
C Summary on used notations
Note that we use several mnemonic notations:
• upper index for a value of a particular buyer (e.g., vm, amt , pmt , etc.);
• boldface for a vector of values for all bidders (e.g., v, at, pt, etc.);
• bar (overline) for terms associated with best value / winning (e.g., the winner mt, the highest valuation
v, etc.); etc.
The full list of used notations is summarized below in the following tables.
C.1 General notations
See Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3.
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Table C.2: General notations: part II.
Notation Expression Description
Reg(. . .) regret of a pricing algorithm
SReg(. . .) strategic regret of a pricing algorithm
Sur(. . .) expected surplus of a buyer (bidder)
γm the discount rate of a buyer m ∈M
γ = {γm}Mm=1 the vector of the discount rates of the buyers
h a buyer history
hmt = (b
m
1:t−1, p
m
1:t, a
m
1:t−1, p
m
1:t−1) the history available to a buyer m in a round t for a given play of the
game
σ ∈ ST a buyer strategy
βm ∈ SM−1T the beliefs of a buyer m on the strategies of the other bidders
β = {βm}Mm=1 the beliefs of all buyers
Ht the set of all possible histories in a round t
Ht1:t2 =unionsqt2t=t1Ht the disjoint union of the sets of histories in rounds t1, . . . , t2
ST the set of all possible buyer strategies
σ˚m an optimal strategy of a buyer m in a round t
b˚mt the optimal bid of a buyer m in a round t for a given play of the game
b˚t = {˚bmt }Mm=1 the optimal bids of all buyers in a round t for a given play of the game
b˚1:T the optimal bids of all buyers in all rounds for a given play of the game
Table C.3: General notations: part III (related to RPPA algorithms).
Notation Expression Description
T(A1) the complete binary tree associated with a RPPA algorithm A1
n or m a node in the complete binary tree T(A1) of a RPPA algorithm A1
r(n) the right child of a node n
l(n) the left child of a node n
R(n) the right subtree of a node n (its root is r(n))
L(n) the left subtree of a node n (its root is l(n))
e(T) the root of a tree T
p(n) the price in a node n (that is offered to a buyer when an algorithm reaches
this node)
T1 ∼= T2 the trees T1 and T2 are price-equivalent
δln = p(n)− infm∈L(n) p(m) the left increment of a node n
C.2 Notations related to dividing algorithms
See Table C.4.
C.3 Notations related to divPRRFES
See Table C.5.
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Table C.4: Notations related to dividing algorithms.
Notation Expression Description
i a period of a dividing algorithm (do not confuse with (1) a round of the
game and (2) a phase of PRRFES algorithm!)
tmi the round in a period i in which the bidder m is not eliminated by
a barrage price (i.e., m is non-eliminated participant) of a dividing
algorithm for a given play of the game
pm,bar or pbar a barrage reserve price
Si the set of bidders suspected by a dividing algorithm in a period i for a
given play of the game
Ti the rounds of a period i for a given play of the game
Im = {tmi }I
m
i=1 the rounds in which the bidder m is not eliminated by a barrage price
(i.e., m is non-eliminated participant) of dividing algorithm for a given
play of the game
Im = |Im| the subhorizon of a buyer m (the number of periods in which he is
suspected, i.e., m ∈ Si) for a given play of the game
Am the subalgorithm of a dividing algorithm that acts against a buyer m
Regm(. . .) Regret of the subalgorithm of a dividing algorithm that acts against a
buyer m
divM (. . .) a div-transformation of 1-buyer pricing algorithm to the case of M
buyers
SRegind(. . .) individual strategic regret of a dividing algorithm
SRegdev(. . .) deviation strategic regret of a dividing algorithm
sr a stopping rule used in a divM -transformation of 1-buyer pricing algo-
rithm
〈A〉 a transformation of a RPPA algorithm A s.t. all penalization sequences
of nodes are replaced by reinforced penalization ones
nmi the tracking node of a buyer m by divM -transformed RPPA algorithm
in a period i for a given play of the game
Table C.5: Notations related to divPRRFES.
Notation Expression Description
r the number of penalization rounds (a parameter of PRRFES)
g(l) the exploitation rate (a parameter of PRRFES)
l a phase of PRRFES
εl = 2
−2l the iteration parameter of a phase l
qml the last accepted price by a buyer m before a phase l for a given play of the game
pml,k the k-th exploration price of a buyer m in a phase l for a given play of the game
Kml the last accepted exploration price of a buyer m in a phase l for a given play of the
game
lmi the current phase of a buyer m in a period i for a given play of the game
l(n) the phase of a node n from the tree of the algorithm PRRFES
q(n) the last accepted price before the current phase of a node n from the tree of the algorithm
PRRFES
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D Discussion & extensions of the result
Improvements of divPRRFES. For practical use, there are several places where divPRRFES can be improved.
For instance, (a) the penalization parameter r can be made adaptive to take into account the rounds in which a
buyer is eliminated (i.e., reduce the number of penalizations by the number of rivals currently suspected by the
seller); (b) or the stopping rule srA1 can faster eliminate bidders, since the lower bound u
m
i can be updated each
time the buyer m accepts an exploration price pml,k. Despite these improvements would require some additional
pages in our proofs, they do not improve the asymptotic bound of O(log log T ).
Horizon independence. The algorithm divPRRFES is horizon-independent since it is based on the horizon-
independent PRRFES A1, which induces the subalgorithm 〈A1〉 and the stopping rule srA1 . Hence, the seller is
not required to know in advance the number of rounds T of the game, when she applies divPRRFES.
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